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When	  I	  was	  a	  graduate	  student	  studying	  anthropology	  at	  the	  CUNY	  Graduate	  Center	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  it	  was	  conventional	  to	  divide	  anthropological	  theory	  between	  ‘idealist’	  and	  ‘materialist’	  approaches.	  	  Most	  students	  found	  this	  distinction	  meaningful,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  too	  stark.	  	  Today	  this	  distinction	  comes	  back	  to	  haunt	  me.	  	  Having	  lived	  in	  Edinburgh	  since	  the	  late	  1990s,	  working	  in	  sociology,	  and	  specialising	  in	  Scotland	  and	  nationalism	  among	  other	  things,	  our	  recent	  referendum	  on	  Scottish	  independence	  has	  forced	  me	  to	  think	  again	  about	  this	  distinction.	  	  Not	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  having	  to	  choose	  between	  materialist	  and	  idealist	  modes	  of	  analysis,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  witnessing	  manifest	  tensions	  between	  materialist	  and	  idealist	  types	  of	  arguments	  in	  the	  debates	  that	  surrounded	  the	  referendum.	  	  Repeatedly	  I	  was	  struck	  by	  how,	  when	  confronted	  by	  the	  sheer	  incalculability	  of	  material	  realities	  and	  future	  economic	  prospects,	  hope,	  aspiration,	  and	  enthusiasm	  seemed	  to	  rush	  in	  to	  fill	  the	  void.	  	  Imponderable,	  and	  frankly	  tedious	  questions	  about	  how	  much	  North	  Sea	  oil	  is	  left,	  what	  will	  become	  of	  the	  Euro,	  and	  so	  on,	  would	  run	  into	  the	  ground,	  to	  be	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supplanted	  by	  affirmations	  of	  sheer	  will.	  	  Before	  I	  say	  more	  about	  this,	  let	  me	  back	  up	  a	  bit,	  and	  present	  the	  general	  situation.	  
On	  September	  18,	  2014,	  a	  referendum	  was	  put	  to	  the	  Scottish	  people	  that	  posed	  the	  question:	  “Should	  Scotland	  be	  an	  independent	  country?’.	  	  On	  a	  record	  84.6%	  turnout,	  55.3%	  answered	  ‘No’,	  while	  44.7%	  answered	  ‘Yes’.	  	  Citizens	  of	  Britain,	  Commonwealth	  Countries,	  and	  other	  European	  Union	  member	  countries	  resident	  in	  Scotland	  were	  eligible	  to	  vote,	  and	  the	  voting	  age	  was	  exceptionally	  lowered	  from	  18	  to	  16	  for	  this	  referendum.	  	  The	  date	  was	  set	  about	  a	  year	  and	  half	  before	  the	  referendum,	  and	  it	  seemed	  to	  take	  about	  a	  year	  before	  the	  public	  debates	  got	  rolling,	  and	  it	  was	  only	  in	  the	  last	  three	  months	  or	  so,	  as	  the	  Yes	  Campaign	  gained	  ground	  and	  polls	  narrowed,	  that	  debates	  really	  began	  to	  heat	  up.	  	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  Britain,	  or	  more	  accurately,	  the	  southeast	  of	  England,	  predominant	  political	  opinion	  in	  Scotland	  tends	  towards	  a	  slightly	  left	  of	  center	  social	  democratic	  model,	  and	  thus	  the	  debate	  in	  Scotland	  was	  couched	  primarily	  as	  one	  between	  contending	  views	  of	  how	  to	  pursue	  that	  social	  democratic	  vision.	  	  Whether	  the	  British	  state	  had	  become	  so	  constitutionally	  clapped-­‐out	  and	  ideologically	  beholden	  to	  a	  ‘neoliberal’	  agenda,	  that	  the	  only	  hope	  of	  progressive	  change	  lay	  in	  departing	  from	  the	  UK	  and	  setting	  up	  a	  new	  state,	  or	  whether	  UK-­‐wide	  left	  solidarities	  and	  pooling	  of	  risks	  were	  worth	  defending,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  more	  rational	  way	  forward.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  other	  more	  rightward	  social	  and	  political	  views	  are	  not	  present	  in	  Scotland,	  but	  they	  are	  distinctly	  muted,	  a	  point	  I	  will	  return	  to.	  	  At	  any	  rate,	  this	  meant	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  that	  dominates	  the	  coalition	  government	  currently	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  UK	  (with	  the	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Liberal	  Democrats),	  and	  that	  agreed	  to	  this	  referendum	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  probably	  expecting	  an	  easy	  win,	  had	  to	  court	  public	  opinion	  in	  Scotland	  gingerly,	  for	  fear	  of	  raising	  the	  ghost	  of	  that	  great	  hate	  figure	  of	  Scotland’s	  period	  of	  de-­‐industrialisation—Margaret	  Thatcher.	  	  	  Thus	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  run	  up,	  it	  was	  former	  Labour	  Prime	  Minister	  Gordon	  Brown	  who	  came	  out	  of	  hiding	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  the	  union,	  and	  serving	  Conservative	  Prime	  Minister	  David	  Cameron	  mostly	  stayed	  home.	  	  	  	  
This	  referendum	  did	  not	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  blue,	  but	  was	  instead	  yet	  another	  episode	  in	  the	  gradualist	  path	  to	  greater	  autonomy	  within	  the	  UK	  (and	  more	  recently	  the	  European	  Union)	  that	  has	  characterised	  modern	  Scottish	  history.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  heavy	  industrialisation	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  Association	  for	  the	  Vindication	  of	  Scottish	  Rights	  and	  the	  Scottish	  Home	  Rule	  Association	  had	  campaigned	  for	  greater	  recognition,	  and	  the	  post	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Scotland	  and	  the	  Scottish	  Office	  had	  been	  set	  up.	  	  In	  the	  1960s,	  after	  three	  decades	  of	  marginality,	  the	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  (SNP)	  began	  to	  have	  intermittent	  success,	  putting	  pressure	  on	  the	  dominant	  Labour	  Party	  to	  eventually	  consider	  putting	  home	  rule	  back	  on	  the	  agenda,	  and	  itself	  shifting	  more	  firmly	  leftward,	  adapting	  to	  the	  left-­‐of-­‐center-­‐ground	  of	  opinion	  in	  which	  support	  had	  to	  be	  won.	  	  By	  1979	  these	  pressures	  led	  to	  a	  referendum	  on	  devolution	  that	  was	  lost,	  but	  by	  1997,	  after	  almost	  two	  decades	  of	  Conservative	  rule,	  deindustrialisation,	  and	  piecemeal	  trimming	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  the	  Labour	  Party	  came	  back	  into	  power,	  having	  secured	  Scottish	  support	  by	  promising	  to	  legislate	  promptly	  on	  a	  new	  referendum	  on	  devolution,	  which	  it	  did,	  holding	  the	  referendum	  that	  same	  year.	  	  	  The	  new	  Scottish	  Parliament	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opened	  in	  July	  1999.	  	  It	  had	  substantial	  devolved	  powers	  over	  domestic	  legislation	  in	  regard	  to	  areas	  such	  as	  health	  care	  and	  education,	  with	  powers	  over	  macro-­‐economic	  policy	  and	  foreign	  affairs	  crucially	  retained	  at	  Westminster.	  
The	  129	  seat	  Scottish	  Parliament	  is	  elected	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  first-­‐past-­‐the	  post	  constituency	  seats,	  topped	  up	  with	  seats	  filled	  from	  party	  lists	  by	  a	  principle	  of	  proportional	  representation,	  to	  achieve	  a	  combination	  of	  direct	  electoral	  mandate	  and	  rough	  proportionality.	  	  This	  design	  was	  expected	  to	  yield	  either	  a	  Labour	  majority	  or	  coalition	  governments	  for	  a	  long	  time	  to	  come.	  	  But	  to	  the	  surprise	  of	  many	  in	  the	  Labour	  camp,	  by	  2007	  the	  SNP	  had	  achieved	  minority	  government	  as	  the	  largest	  party,	  and	  by	  2011	  the	  SNP	  had	  achieved	  a	  majority	  government	  and	  proceeded	  towards	  legislating	  for	  the	  referendum	  on	  independence,	  as	  promised,	  naturally	  enough,	  in	  their	  party	  manifesto.	  	  In	  general,	  this	  success	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  SNP	  is	  today	  a	  left-­‐of-­‐center	  party	  only	  marginally	  different	  in	  its	  domestic	  policies	  from	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  with	  a	  relatively	  able	  and	  charismatic	  leader	  in	  Alex	  Salmond1,	  and	  has	  managed	  to	  appear	  competent	  and	  as	  working	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  people	  in	  Scotland.	  	  Meanwhile	  the	  Labour	  Party	  in	  Scotland	  during	  this	  same	  period	  has	  been	  dogged	  by	  ineffectual	  leadership,	  and	  an	  appearance	  of	  being	  run	  from	  the	  UK	  center,	  and	  tarnished	  by	  the	  mantle	  of	  ‘New	  Labour’,	  which	  is	  frequently	  seen	  as	  having	  compromised	  too	  much	  with	  neoliberalism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Salmond	  stepped	  down	  as	  party	  leader	  immediately	  after	  the	  referendum,	  and	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  his	  former	  deputy,	  Nicola	  Sturgeon.	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It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  in	  the	  Scottish	  context,	  correlations	  between	  national	  identity,	  party	  support,	  and	  constitutional	  preferences	  are	  loose	  and	  shifting.	  While	  a	  small	  minority	  that	  identifies	  as	  British	  more	  than	  Scottish,	  supports	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  and	  prefers	  the	  union	  and	  is	  lukewarm	  about	  devolution	  is	  relatively	  stable,	  at	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  left-­‐right	  spectrum,	  voting	  for	  the	  SNP	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  one	  wants	  independence,	  nor	  voting	  for	  Labour	  an	  assurance	  that	  one	  doesn’t.	  	  And	  almost	  everyone	  at	  this	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  identifies	  as	  equally	  or	  more	  Scottish	  than	  British.	  	  So	  as	  I	  suggested	  before,	  our	  most	  recent	  independence	  referendum	  debates	  took	  place	  within	  a	  frame	  of	  identification	  with	  a	  broad,	  left-­‐of-­‐center	  Scottishness.	  	  Moreover,	  polling	  for	  many	  years	  has	  oscillated	  roughly	  around	  25-­‐30%	  in	  favour	  of	  independence,	  50%	  in	  favour	  of	  increasing	  devolved	  powers,	  and	  around	  20-­‐25%	  wanting	  to	  remain	  with	  the	  devolved	  status	  quo.	  	  Thus	  by	  far	  the	  dominant	  preference,	  more	  powers	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  (which	  came	  to	  be	  known	  in	  referendum	  parlance	  as	  ‘devo-­‐max’)	  was,	  after	  some	  negotiation,	  excluded	  from	  the	  independence	  referendum,	  which	  instead	  offered	  a	  strict	  yes	  or	  no	  choice.	  	  So	  people	  of	  this	  dominant	  middle	  position	  were	  forced	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  that	  they	  would	  not	  otherwise	  have	  made.	  	  It	  is	  probable	  that	  both	  Alex	  Salmond	  and	  David	  Cameron	  (and	  their	  advisors)	  reasoned	  that	  the	  difficulties	  of	  interpreting	  a	  three-­‐way	  distribution	  of	  choices,	  that	  primarily	  confirmed	  the	  general	  direction	  of	  gradualist	  travel,	  would	  not	  serve	  either	  of	  their	  causes	  all	  that	  well.	  	  Cameron	  could	  hope	  that	  on	  balance	  people	  would	  be	  scared	  away	  from	  independence,	  appearing	  to	  simply	  prefer	  the	  status	  quo	  (‘no’),	  while	  Salmond	  could	  reasonably	  claim	  that	  anything	  around	  35%	  was	  a	  historic	  high-­‐water	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mark	  for	  the	  independence	  cause,	  and	  showed	  that	  history	  was	  inexorably	  moving	  in	  the	  SNP’s	  direction.	  	  	  	  
As	  it	  turned	  out,	  according	  to	  polling	  data,	  from	  a	  spread	  on	  February	  1,	  2013	  of	  47%	  ‘no’,	  32%	  ‘yes’	  and	  21%	  ‘don’t	  know’,	  the	  ‘don’t	  knows’	  gradually	  ebbed	  away	  from	  mid-­‐July	  2014,	  and	  the	  gap	  between	  ‘yes’	  and	  ‘no’	  closed,	  although	  with	  ‘no’	  having	  a	  slight	  lead	  of	  often	  less	  than	  5	  points	  in	  most	  polls	  (see	  website:	  What	  Scotland	  Thinks).	  	  It	  was	  neck-­‐and-­‐neck.	  	  It	  appeared	  that	  the	  yes	  campaign	  might	  just	  pull	  it	  off,	  despite	  the	  scepticism	  of	  long-­‐time,	  careful	  observers	  of	  this	  process.	  	  In	  the	  final	  days	  of	  the	  campaign	  the	  various	  ‘unionist’	  parties	  	  (Labour,	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  Conservatives)	  asserted	  a	  ‘vow’	  to	  work	  together	  to	  hammer-­‐out	  a	  new	  set	  of	  increased	  powers	  for	  the	  existing	  Scottish	  parliament	  as	  away	  of	  showing	  that	  something	  better	  would	  be	  on	  offer	  if	  one	  voted	  no.	  	  And	  the	  all-­‐party	  commission	  led	  by	  Lord	  Kelvin	  Smith	  has	  already	  begun	  consulting	  on	  proposals	  for	  increased	  powers,	  details	  to	  be	  worked	  out	  in	  the	  coming	  months.	  	  So	  ironically,	  the	  substantial	  outcome	  of	  the	  referendum	  will	  be	  another	  step	  along	  the	  slow	  path	  of	  gradually	  increasing	  devolution,	  despite	  the	  perverse	  decision	  to	  rule	  out	  this	  alternative	  from	  the	  referendum	  itself.	  	  But	  then,	  that	  is	  how	  much	  of	  democratic	  politics	  actually	  works.	  
For	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  essay,	  let	  me	  try	  to	  look	  behind	  the	  blow-­‐by-­‐blow	  politics,	  to	  say	  something	  about	  the	  material	  circumstances	  and	  ideational	  atmosphere,	  about	  the	  wider	  political	  culture,	  that	  shaped	  this	  latest	  referendum.	  	  As	  a	  US	  citizen,	  with	  no	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  this	  election,	  I	  found	  myself	  in	  a	  liminal	  position,	  as	  long	  time	  friends	  took	  positions	  on	  either	  side,	  and	  tempers	  occasionally	  frayed.	  	  My	  own	  position,	  despite	  not	  having	  a	  vote,	  was	  that	  I	  was	  unconvinced	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that	  the	  case	  was	  being	  adequately	  made	  to	  go	  for	  full	  independence	  at	  this	  point,	  given	  the	  weakened	  state	  of	  the	  world	  and	  European	  economy,	  considerable	  national	  debt,	  and	  the	  SNP’s	  contested	  proposal	  to	  remain	  in	  a	  currency	  union	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK.	  	  This	  proposal	  stuck	  me	  as	  extremely	  problematic,	  because	  either	  much	  of	  Scottish	  policy	  would	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  or	  intolerable	  tensions	  would	  develop	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  
One	  often	  has	  to	  explain	  to	  outsiders	  the	  way	  nationalism	  in	  Scotland	  is	  largely	  moderate	  and	  to	  the	  left.	  	  It	  mobilises	  historical	  and	  cultural	  symbols,	  but	  for	  the	  most	  part	  in	  a	  fairly	  flexible	  and	  inclusive	  way.	  	  It	  is,	  on	  balance,	  more	  ‘liberal’	  than	  ‘ethnic’	  in	  its	  core	  concepts	  and	  symbols.	  	  It	  discourse	  is	  characterised	  less	  by	  cultural	  essentialism,	  and	  more	  by	  the	  classic	  Enlightenment	  aspiration	  to	  establish	  collective	  liberty	  through	  the	  founding	  of	  ‘new’	  nations,	  as	  in	  the	  British	  Colonies	  in	  1776	  and	  France	  in	  1789.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  peculiar	  ideological	  innovation	  of	  the	  18th	  century,	  of	  the	  people	  collectively	  ruling	  themselves	  as	  supposed	  equals,	  that	  the	  problematic	  and	  enduring	  nature	  of	  modern	  nationalism	  lies.	  	  The	  result	  was	  an	  ideological	  template	  with	  a	  specific	  formal	  principle,	  the	  people	  must	  rule	  themselves,	  but	  chronic	  indeterminacy	  as	  to	  the	  ideas	  and	  symbols	  that	  give	  this	  form	  content.	  	  The	  people	  can	  be	  defined	  by	  ethnicity,	  religion,	  language,	  history,	  political	  ideology,	  civic	  values,	  and	  so	  on	  almost	  indefinitely.	  	  And	  these	  can	  be	  used	  to	  bolster	  national	  political	  programmes	  in	  all	  sorts	  of	  ways,	  civic	  and	  ethnic,	  leftward	  and	  rightward,	  and	  usually	  somewhere	  in	  between.	  	  Where	  the	  democratic	  state	  is	  the	  dominant	  political	  organisation,	  people	  are	  obliged	  to	  couch	  their	  political	  projects,	  whatever	  side	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they	  come	  from,	  in	  national	  terms,	  as	  an	  argument	  about	  who	  we	  are,	  in	  this	  territory,	  what	  our	  values	  should	  be,	  and	  how	  we	  should	  govern	  ourselves.	  	  And	  sometimes,	  as	  may	  eventually	  happen	  in	  the	  Scottish	  case,	  divisions	  and	  polarisation	  may	  become	  so	  strong	  that	  (aided	  by	  contingencies	  of	  territorial	  history),	  secession	  rather	  than	  struggle	  over	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  larger	  whole,	  may	  seem	  the	  best	  or	  only	  solution.	  	  All	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  in	  Scotland,	  normal	  politics	  is	  not	  a	  struggle	  between	  nationalism	  (represented	  by	  the	  SNP)	  and	  something	  else,	  it	  is	  between	  contending	  nationalisms.	  	  In	  the	  referendum,	  both	  sides,	  yes	  and	  no,	  were	  advocating	  their	  preferred	  conception	  of	  the	  Scottish	  nation	  and	  what	  is	  in	  its	  interest.	  	  	  
The	  recent	  referendum	  was	  disturbing	  in	  certain	  respects,	  precisely	  because	  there	  is	  a	  commonsense	  view	  in	  Scotland	  that	  we	  are	  pretty	  much	  all	  ‘left	  of	  center’	  and	  ‘want	  what’s	  best	  for	  Scotland’,	  while	  also	  wanting	  to	  be	  good,	  outward	  looking	  ‘global	  citizens’.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  referendum	  forced	  people	  to	  make	  a	  strategic	  choice	  that	  cut	  through	  the	  middle	  of	  this	  broad	  consensus,	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  consensus	  is	  perhaps	  not	  all	  it	  appears	  to	  be.	  	  In	  the	  20th	  century,	  Scottish	  public	  opinion,	  and	  the	  opinions	  of	  its	  leading	  professional	  classes,	  consolidated	  around	  the	  Keynesian	  vision	  of	  a	  modern	  welfare	  state,	  with	  substantial	  active	  intervention	  from	  government	  to	  offset	  economic	  problems.	  	  This	  contributed	  to	  the	  relative	  hegemony	  of	  the	  Labour	  Party	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  that	  century,	  which	  it	  has	  lost	  its	  grip	  on	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  	  Meanwhile,	  from	  a	  high	  point	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  saw	  a	  decline	  in	  its	  support	  in	  Scotland,	  precipitously	  in	  the	  last	  three	  decades.	  	  The	  dominant	  discourse	  in	  Scotland’s	  political	  culture	  is	  about	  how	  to	  become	  a	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Scandanavian-­‐like	  social	  democracy	  within	  the	  policy	  confines	  of	  a	  ‘neoliberal’	  state	  featuring	  low	  levels	  of	  taxation,	  a	  very	  open	  economy,	  and	  a	  preference	  for	  privatisation	  and	  austerity	  to	  reduce	  governmental	  costs.	  	  But	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  Scotland’s	  political	  culture,	  like	  all	  political	  cultures,	  is	  an	  artefact	  of	  the	  prevailing	  balance	  of	  powers	  in	  the	  UK,	  not	  a	  direct	  reflection	  of	  some	  underlying	  reality.	  	  	  A	  left-­‐leaning,	  highly	  educated	  and	  professionalised	  middle	  class	  is	  able	  to	  dominate	  Scotland’s	  domestic	  politics	  precisely	  because	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  soil	  its	  hands	  with	  the	  levers	  of	  macroeconomics,	  beholden	  to	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London,	  and	  of	  international	  relations,	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  major	  players	  such	  as	  the	  US,	  China,	  and	  Russia.	  	  While	  there	  is	  only	  one	  Scottish	  Conservative	  MP	  at	  Westminster,	  by	  proportional	  representation	  15	  out	  of	  the	  current	  129	  MPs	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  are	  Conservatives	  (down	  from	  18	  a	  few	  years	  ago).	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  while	  clearly	  a	  minority,	  there	  is	  an	  enduring	  constituency	  here,	  one	  I	  suspect	  has	  disengaged	  a	  bit	  from	  Scottish	  politics	  under	  the	  circumstances,	  as	  many	  of	  its	  core	  class	  interest	  can	  be	  met	  through	  other	  British	  institutions.	  	  But	  if	  Scotland	  were	  to	  become	  independent,	  my	  guess	  is	  that	  one	  should	  expect	  this	  constituency	  to	  reassess	  its	  interests	  and	  use	  its	  powers	  to	  strengthen	  its	  position,	  to	  come	  out	  of	  relative	  dormancy	  as	  it	  were.	  	  In	  the	  recent	  2014	  European	  parliamentary	  elections,	  the	  right-­‐wing,	  anti-­‐immigration	  UK	  Independence	  Party	  won	  10%	  of	  the	  vote	  (on	  an	  admittedly	  low	  turnout)	  sending	  one	  Scottish	  UKIP	  member	  to	  Strasbourg,	  disquieting	  the	  popular	  view	  that	  Scotland	  would	  have	  no	  truck	  with	  such	  things.	  	  I	  suspect	  that	  this	  UKIP	  support	  in	  Scotland	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  found	  more	  strongly	  in	  England,	  among	  highly	  alienated	  working	  class	  people	  who	  feel	  abandoned	  by	  Labour.	  	  	  Again,	  this	  represents	  a	  small	  minority.	  	  However,	  I	  do	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think	  the	  language	  around	  the	  independence	  referendum	  proceeded	  as	  if	  natural	  constituencies	  of	  right	  wing	  and	  ‘neoliberal’	  economic	  interests,	  and	  parochial	  and	  beleaguered	  working	  class	  interests,	  were	  not	  present	  in	  Scotland,	  and	  would	  not	  be	  present	  in	  an	  independent	  Scotland.	  	  I	  think	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  these	  views	  would	  become	  more	  visible,	  and	  have	  to	  be	  somehow	  integrated	  into	  the	  general	  political	  culture.	  
All	  this	  is	  normal	  for	  any	  modern	  European	  country,	  and	  not	  a	  case	  against	  independence	  per	  se.	  	  But	  it	  flags	  up	  the	  somewhat	  surreal	  quality	  of	  the	  Yes	  Campaign.	  	  This	  was	  a	  coalition	  was	  led	  by	  the	  SNP	  on	  one	  front,	  proffering	  a	  white	  paper	  on	  independence	  and	  offering	  a	  not	  entirely	  coherent	  combination	  of	  Scandinavian	  ideals,	  and	  small-­‐nation,	  business-­‐friendly	  economic	  policies,	  with	  another	  wing,	  further	  to	  the	  left,	  more	  ‘grassroots’,	  organised	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  ‘radical	  independence’,	  offering	  a	  more	  thorough-­‐going	  critique	  of	  capitalism,	  and	  casting	  the	  project	  more	  as	  a	  fight-­‐back	  for	  the	  working	  classes.	  	  In	  this	  mix	  was	  a	  small	  but	  effective	  Green	  Party,	  seeing	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  advance	  its	  mixture	  of	  ecological	  and	  egalitarian	  politics.	  These	  last	  two	  are	  positions	  with	  which	  I	  have	  sympathies.	  	  For	  all	  of	  these,	  the	  prospect	  of	  an	  independent	  country	  served	  as	  a	  blank	  canvass	  on	  which	  to	  project	  visions	  of	  a	  better	  world.	  	  On	  the	  ‘Better	  Together’	  (i.e.	  ‘No’)	  side,	  leadership	  was	  generally	  provided	  by	  Scottish	  stalwarts	  of	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  such	  as	  Alastair	  Darling,	  Douglas	  Alexander,	  and	  finally	  Gordon	  Brown.	  	  The	  Conservatives	  and	  Liberal	  Democrats	  tended	  to	  play	  a	  back	  seat	  role,	  aware	  of	  the	  unpopularity	  in	  Scotland	  of	  their	  current	  coalition	  government	  in	  Westminster,	  and	  the	  general	  un-­‐receptivity	  to	  interventions	  from	  down	  south,	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in	  what	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  Scottish	  matter.	  	  An	  exception	  to	  this	  was	  the	  able	  debating	  skills	  of	  the	  new	  leader	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Conservatives,	  Ruth	  Davidson,	  who	  could	  speak	  with	  more	  authority	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament.	  	  If	  the	  yes	  campaign	  tended	  toward	  utopian	  vision,	  the	  no	  campaign	  tended	  toward	  dreary	  facts	  and	  policy-­‐speak	  (see	  Paterson,	  forthcoming).	  	  Where	  the	  yes	  team	  were	  building	  a	  better	  tomorrow,	  the	  no	  team	  were	  picking	  things	  apart	  and	  finding	  holes	  (some	  quite	  real	  in	  my	  opinion).	  	  	  
Part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  simply	  that	  the	  hard	  material	  questions	  about	  what	  the	  future	  of	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  would	  look	  like	  are	  very	  difficult	  to	  calculate.	  	  Materialist	  explanation	  is	  always	  easier	  in	  retrospect.	  	  I	  have	  little	  doubt	  that	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  would	  eventually	  weather	  the	  rough	  storms	  of	  transition,	  be	  as	  economically	  viable	  as	  similar	  small	  European	  countries,	  and	  be	  welcomed	  back	  into	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  But	  how	  far	  it	  would	  be	  able	  to	  travel	  towards	  the	  idealised	  visions	  proffered	  by	  the	  yes	  campaign	  I	  am	  unsure.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  how	  much	  North	  Sea	  oil	  is	  left	  (experts	  disagree)	  and	  how	  long	  tax	  revenues	  from	  that	  industry	  might	  help	  subsidise	  the	  Scottish	  economy	  on	  its	  social	  democratic	  path.	  	  Given	  the	  weakened	  state	  of	  European	  economies	  post-­‐2008,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  how	  quickly	  the	  regional	  economy	  might	  recover,	  which	  is	  a	  critical	  context	  for	  Scotland.	  	  At	  what	  pace	  would	  Scotland	  be	  able	  to	  unburden	  itself	  of	  the	  share	  of	  the	  UK	  national	  debt	  that	  it	  would	  inherit	  	  (which	  is	  still	  growing)?	  	  This	  again	  depends	  on	  the	  general	  economic	  recovery	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  UK,	  the	  effects	  of	  long	  term	  inflation	  on	  national	  debt,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  other	  unanticipated	  shocks.	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Again	  and	  again,	  in	  public	  and	  private	  debates,	  I	  witnessed	  people	  simply	  talking	  past	  one	  another,	  not	  really	  engaging	  with	  the	  premise	  of	  the	  others’	  argument,	  because	  it	  didn’t	  start	  from	  the	  same	  aspirational	  or	  sceptical	  assumptions.	  	  The	  overall	  effect	  of	  this	  discursive	  stalemate,	  was	  that	  the	  ‘no’	  campaign	  seemed	  to	  be	  hectoring	  and	  fact-­‐crunching	  to	  an	  audience	  that	  had	  lost	  interest	  in	  irresolvable	  questions,	  while	  the	  ‘yes’	  campaign	  frequently	  reduced	  the	  opposing	  view	  to	  a	  general	  psychological	  state,	  of	  being	  cowed	  by	  the	  threats	  of	  Westminster	  and	  Big	  Business,	  of	  being,	  as	  the	  Scots	  say	  ‘feart’	  (afraid,	  as	  a	  general	  disposition).	  	  If	  rational	  predictions	  could	  reasonably	  be	  steered	  either	  way,	  than	  these	  tended	  to	  fall	  by	  the	  wayside,	  and	  it	  became	  a	  question	  of	  courage	  versus	  cowardice	  (on	  the	  yes	  side),	  or	  reality	  versus	  utopia	  (on	  the	  no	  side).	  	  One	  side	  was	  battling	  to	  capture	  hearts,	  while	  the	  other	  side	  was	  battling	  to	  capture	  minds.	  	  At	  any	  rate,	  the	  dust	  is	  settling,	  old	  friends	  that	  found	  themselves	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  divide	  are	  either	  letting	  things	  lie,	  or	  gently	  exploring	  differences	  with	  some	  detachment.	  	  Meanwhile,	  work	  is	  proceeding	  on	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  set	  of	  further	  devolved	  powers	  for	  Scotland	  that	  can	  be	  agreed	  by	  all	  parties.	  
What	  might	  the	  implications	  of	  all	  this	  be	  for	  Britain	  as	  a	  whole?	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  say.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  in	  certain	  respects,	  the	  issue	  of	  Scottish	  discontent	  with	  the	  UK	  is	  part	  of	  the	  general	  problem	  of	  the	  entire	  UK	  being	  dominated	  by	  a	  London-­‐centric,	  high	  finance	  economy.	  	  Much	  of	  Wales	  and	  the	  English	  north	  and	  midlands,	  and	  all	  the	  major	  northern	  cities,	  have	  grievances	  with	  an	  economy	  in	  which	  they	  all	  routinely	  play	  second	  fiddle	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  investment.	  	  Immediately	  after	  the	  referendum	  there	  was	  much	  talk	  about	  the	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need	  for	  a	  rethink	  of	  devolution	  across	  the	  UK,	  with	  Cameron	  seeing	  it	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  ‘fix’	  the	  problem	  of	  Scottish	  MPs	  in	  Westminster	  being	  able	  to	  vote	  on	  legislative	  issues	  that	  concern	  England,	  but	  are	  devolved	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  by	  restricting	  when	  they	  can	  vote	  in	  Westminster.	  	  These	  are	  of	  course	  largely	  Labour	  MPs,	  critical	  to	  the	  UK	  Labour	  Party’s	  capacity	  to	  push	  through	  legislation	  in	  England.	  	  Some	  urban	  leaders	  have	  justly	  seen	  it	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  argue	  for	  greater	  powers	  devolved	  to	  UK	  cities.	  	  	  Welsh	  politicians	  have	  seen	  it	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  call	  for	  more	  powers	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  for	  Wales.	  	  The	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  a	  long	  held	  policy	  in	  favour	  of	  federalism	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  more	  generally	  of	  decentralising	  power,	  so	  these	  events	  are	  grist	  for	  their	  mill.	  	  	  But	  Britain	  is	  an	  extremely	  London-­‐centric	  place,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  question	  about	  whether	  the	  larger	  message	  of	  this	  referendum	  for	  the	  UK	  as	  a	  whole	  will	  sink	  in.	  	  That	  message	  is:	  there	  is	  widespread	  alienation	  in	  the	  UK	  from	  the	  free-­‐market	  driven,	  London	  dominated	  economy,	  and	  this	  is	  expressing	  itself	  as	  weakening	  support	  for	  the	  Labour	  and	  Conservative	  parties,	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  SNP	  in	  Scotland,	  and	  UKIP	  in	  England.	  	  The	  referendum	  on	  Scottish	  independence	  gave	  people	  in	  one	  part	  of	  the	  UK	  a	  context	  and	  means	  to	  express	  that	  alienation,	  but	  in	  many	  respects	  this	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  relevant	  only	  to	  Scotland.	  	  There	  is	  a	  deeper	  and	  wider	  political	  malaise.	  	  
Does	  all	  this	  have	  any	  implications	  for	  what	  we	  should	  think	  about	  nationalism	  in	  general?	  	  Yes.	  	  It	  should	  help	  us	  recognise	  that	  nationalism,	  in	  the	  way	  I	  have	  defined	  it	  above,	  is	  normal.	  	  It	  becomes	  peculiarly	  visible	  when	  aligned	  with	  options	  of	  territorial	  secession,	  as	  in	  the	  Scottish	  case,	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  separation	  between	  Scotland	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK.	  	  But	  within	  Scotland,	  the	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referendum	  triggered	  an	  episode	  in	  an	  ongoing	  argument	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  country	  the	  people	  in	  Scotland	  want	  to	  live	  in,	  and	  how	  to	  get	  there.	  	  This	  is	  the	  regular	  stuff	  of	  elections	  in	  liberal	  democracies	  more	  generally.	  	  Nationalism,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  ongoing	  debate	  about	  identity	  and	  values	  in	  the	  context	  of	  people	  having	  power	  over	  one	  another	  as	  citizens,	  is	  the	  routine	  fuel	  that	  modern	  states	  and	  their	  political	  systems	  run	  on.	  	  There	  has	  to	  be	  an	  ongoing	  argument.	  	  Far	  from	  being	  an	  exotic	  exception,	  that	  rears	  its	  head	  from	  time	  to	  time	  in	  ethnically	  divided	  backward	  regions,	  nationalism	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  normal	  and	  unavoidable.	  	  And	  the	  people	  in	  Scotland	  have	  managed	  to	  engage	  in	  it	  in	  its	  most	  acute	  form,	  where	  the	  secession	  option	  is	  on	  the	  table,	  peaceably,	  and	  with	  remarkably	  high	  democratic	  participation.	  	  In	  that	  we	  all	  must	  ‘do’	  nationalism	  to	  some	  extent,	  Scotland	  sets	  a	  pretty	  good	  example	  of	  how	  to	  do	  it.	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